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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR TUSHNET
JOHN M. ROGERS*
In this essay, Professor Rogers responds to an article by Pro-
fessor Mark Tushnet, Principles, Politics and Constitutional
Law. In that article, Professor Tushnet argued that in the
confirmation process, the constitutional scheme authorizes a
senator to act solely with regard to partisan concerns. He ar-
gued that politics in this sense is built into the Constitution,
as reflected in the political questions doctrine. He concluded
by stating that "all the Constitution really requires is that
politics be given its ordinary range of operation, that ambi-
tion be set to counter ambition," all other arguments are
sophistry.
Mark Tushnet has argued in an essay in the Michigan Law Re-
view that it is appropriate for United States Senators to vote for or
against judicial nominees entirely on narrow partisan grounds.'
His essay can be refuted in a few paragraphs, and perhaps should
be.
Tushnet's argument goes like this: The largest part of public
policy is made through-and limited only by-the operation of
ordinary politics.' The political questions doctrine, under which
some constitutional questions are not judicially reviewable, remits
such questions to this political process.' The justification for doing
so is the combined "unavailability of external evaluative criteria
and the general trustworthiness of the ordinary political process"
in those cases where the doctrine applies.4 Examples are the
House of Representatives' determination of the qualifications of
members, the Senate's action in impeaching a President, and fed-
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eral legislation regulating the states "as States." Critics of the Sen-
ate's treatment of Judge Bork imply "that it is in some sense con-
stitutionally improper for ordinary politics to play a role in the
confirmation process,"' 5 but Tushnet argues that questions of the
proper scope of senatorial inquiry are also political questions.'
Therefore, according to Tushnet, "the Constitution authorizes
a senator to act solely with reference to political concerns."7 He
argues that the political questions doctrine applies both to the
scope of senatorial inquiry and to the ultimate confirmation deci-
sion.8 A Senator is therefore "free to take a position on that ques-
tion [whether to confirm] solely with reference to electoral consid-
erations."9 This conclusion is supported by Tushnet's contentions
that constitutional norms applicable to the confirmation question
are difficult to identify, and that senatorial reliance solely on elec-
toral considerations would not lead to undesirable consequences."0
Tushnet goes -on to criticize those of "Judge Bork's supporters
who claimed that the political process was insufficiently respectful
of constitutional norms," for making an argument inconsistent
with the political questions doctrine when those same supporters
would normally advocate the separation-of-powers policies under-
lying the political questions doctrine."
Tushnet concludes by rejecting any scholarly legal argument
that, for instance, senators should confine their inquiries to a
nominee's character and ability. "[A]Il the Constitution really re-
quires is that politics be given its ordinary range of operation, that
ambition be set to counteract ambition."12 Other arguments are
sophistry. 3
Put simply, Tushnet fails to distinguish between the issue of
whether a branch has the power to interpret the Constitution, and
the issue of what is the proper interpretation. The distinction is
5 Id. at 66.
6 Id. at 76-78.
Id. at 68.
' See id. at 77. "Most of the political considerations that justify treating the scope of
inquiry as a political question apply as well to the confirmation issue." Id.
Id. at 76.
10 Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 80.
12 Id. at 81.
13 Id.
258
Vol. 7: 257, 1991
Tushnet Mixing Levels
obvious if we look at the Supreme Court. It is almost a tautology
to say that if the Supreme Court has the final constitutional power
to interpret certain constitutional issues, then it has the power to
interpret them "wrong" under some independently applied stan-
dard. If one argues, for instance, that it is wrong for Justices to
interpret the Constitution on purely political grounds, it is simply
no answer to say that the Court has the power to do so. Of course
the Court has the power to do so, but that power doesn't make
the decision correct. Otherwise, all criticism of Supreme Court
decisions would be meaningless.
Yet this is precisely the argument that Tushnet makes with re-
spect to the Senate when he relies upon the political questions
doctrine to justify confirmation decisions based upon political
grounds. It is unexceptionable-one might say obvious-to inter-
pret the Constitution to give the Senate the final power to answer
the question of what is the scope of its inquiry into judicial nomi-
nees. But how the question should be answered is an entirely dif-
ferent issue. The "right to decide" simply does not imply that
"any ground is as good as another." If we can criticize the Su-
preme Court for a badly reasoned decision, we certainly can do
the same for the Senate when it exercises its Constitution-applying
(and therefore necessarily Constitution-interpreting) function.
The political questions doctrine keeps certain issues out of the
courts, and thereby gives to the political branches the final say on
those issues. But it does not tell the political branches what to say.
Tushnet uses three examples where Congress makes decisions that
are arguably not reviewable by the courts under the political ques-
tions doctrine: whether a member of the House of Representa-
tives is qualified, whether a President should be impeached, and
to what extent the states should be regulated "as States."' 4 Logi-
cal constitutional arguments can be marshalled for permitting
these decisions to be made finally by the political branches rather
than by the courts. But that does not mean that Representative
Doe should vote to exclude an allegedly 29-year-old member that
Doe believes to be 31 simply because Doe objects to the new
member's politics. Nor should a Senator vote to convict a Presi-
11 Id. at 53-62.
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dent who has been impeached on the charge of committing a high
crime or misdemeanor merely because the Senator objects to the
President's politics, even though, of course, the Senator has the
power to do so. Nor should Congress pass legislation effectively
eliminating state government, even if the Court has made clear
that Congress would be permitted to do so. "Political question,"
in other words, does not mean that politics is the appropriate basis
for decision.
Tushnet effectively concedes that there are objectively determi-
nable limits on what a governmental branch may do even though
no other branch is given the power to review. 15 For instance, he
talks about politics as a "constraint," but the very meaning of
"constraint" connotes a limit. If a branch goes too far, then some-
thing must determine what is "too far." The constraint that
Tushnet talks about is thus a meaningless concept unless there is
some line within which the branch should be constrained. It is
even clearer that Tushnet concedes the existence of limits upon
what an unreviewable branch can do when he talks about "norma-
tively troubling outcomes. 16 "Normatively troubling outcomes"
apparently contain "constitutionally erroneous" ones as a subset.1
Once we have concluded that there are right and wrong deci-
sions to be made by the Senate about judicial nominees, then we
should demand that our Senators make right (i.e., constitutional)
decisions about nominees, and criticize them when they don't, all
the while preserving the Senate's right to make such decisions. If
the Senate votes on political grounds and that is not "right," it is
no answer to say that the Senate has the power to do so. This is
simply mixing levels, confusing who can decide with what is the
right answer."
" Id. at 70 n.69.
'e Id. at 68-71.
Id. at 70 n.69.
S8 ee id. at 79. At one point Tushnet does defend his position on grounds that at least
may be said to cut in his favor: first, that the President's consideration of politics in select-
ing a nominee justifies the Senate's doing so, and second, that the Senate's power vis-a-vis
the Supreme Court would better reflect appropriate checks and balances if the Senate con-
sidered a nominee's likely actions on the Court. Id. These standard arguments are but
cursorily made and hardly justify the elaborate but illogical reliance on the political ques-
tions doctrine to establish that politics is the constitutional norm for Senate evaluation of
judicial nominees.
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If Tushnet is only arguing that the Senate has the power to con-
sider judicial nominees on purely political grounds, then the argu-
ment is unexceptionable, but obvious. But if he is arguing that a
Senator complies with his or her constitutional duty by doing
so-as he appears to be' 9-then his argument simply does not
support his conclusion."
" See id. at 81. "1A]II the Constitution really requires is that politics be given its ordinary
range of operation, that ambition be set to counteract ambition." Id.
0 That Tushnet is doing the latter is confirmed by his finding "something anomalous"
in Judge Bork's supporters' having "objected to the sort of political behavior [on the part
of Senators] that they expected Judge Bork to approve if confirmed." Id. at 80. There is no
anomaly here. Had he been confirmed, Judge Bork may have found a greater number of
constitutional decisions to be finally determinable by Congress; that doesn't mean that such
congressional decisions can be made on any ground. Indeed, the more that constitutional
decisions are committed to Congress, the more the Congress has a responsibility to decide
correctly. By using the word "approve" in the above quote, Tushnet suggests that a Su-
preme Court Justice agrees with a constitutional decision that he or she finds Congress has
the power to make. Again, saying a body has power to make a decision does not imply
agreement with the decision. Law professors, for instance, disagree all the time with the
Supreme Court decisions that they would concede the Court has the power to make.
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